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May you not live in interesting times --so goes the ancient Chinese 
proverb. As in English, interesting is to be taken as an obvious 
understatement. The proverb refers possibly to times such as the 
present, where questions about the immediate future are piling up in 
many countries, begging for answers.
In China, 2012 is on its way to earning the Annus horribilis label: former 
political star Bo Xilai stripped of political immunity, placed under 
investigation and waiting for trial; the “New York Times” report 
(25.10.2012) on Premier Wen Jiabao’s alleged family wealth; the 
lower-than-foreseen economic growth (China’s GDP grew 7.4% in 
the third quarter, missing the government’s target for the first time 
since the financial crisis); the ongoing territorial row with Japan over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao islands; Tibetans immolating themselves 
at an embarrassing rate (four, during the last week in October) –to 
name just a few of the current headaches for the Chinese leadership. 
By far their main challenge, though, is the 18th Communist Party 
Congress in November, where seven of the nine members of the all-
important Politburo Standing Committee will be retiring --including 
current paramount leader Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—, 
and a new generation (the so-called fifth generation) will take the 
helm. This coincides in time with the planned renewal of 70% of the 
Central Military Commission and the Executive Committee of the 
State Council, thus signalling the most significant political leadership 
transition in decades.
Seán Golden points out that the first thing to understand about the 
Congress is that the Party in China is much more than the Party –it’s 
the System.
If it were possible to hold elections in China and the Communist party of China 
(CPC) lost, the country would come to a halt –the civil service would stop. In China, 
they never separated Church and State. Power is a grid with three columns --Party, 
State, and the Military--, in which the horizontal rows are the same: the new CPC 
Secretary-general will become China’s President, there is no distinction between the 
two –as if the Pope were to become Italy’s Prime Minister. We do not know when 
he will become President of the Military Commission too (it is likely that his pre-
decessor, Hu Jintao, will keep the post for the next two years). The same applies at 
level two (the Vice-Secretary-General of the Party is also Prime Minister) and so on 
down the line. The obligation of the Party to care for political purity is embedded 
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in the state –hence, multi-party proposals are out of order. Ideological purity means 
ideological control of the political administration and the military force. This is one 
of the main reasons why China is not efficient: in every ministry, in every local gov-
ernment, there is an administrator and a party official (same rank) at each level of 
administration, so that in case of disagreement, appeal has to be made to a higher 
authority.
 
The 16th CPC Congress in 2002 enshrined the practice of “collective 
leadership” and governing through consensus –meaning that the 
paramount leader shares power with his circle of senior leaders in the 
Politburo Standing Committee, particularly the Premier. Would you 
say that this is what characterizes the fourth and fifth generations as 
opposed to the previous ones?
The first generation had a centre: Mao Zedong. The second, had Deng Xiaoping. 
These leaders, like the emperors, named their successors. They did so to protect their 
legacy –to keep some control so as to protect themselves. Deng Xiaoping did not 
allow  Jiang Zemin, the third generation’s paramount leader, to choose his succes-
sor –and so Hu Jintao became Secretary-general and President. Hu Jintao was not 
allowed to choose his successor at the last Party Congress in 2007. This showed that 
collective leadership was very much in force. Now, it is important to note that the 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee increased in 2002 from seven to nine, 
which meant that more factions within the Party were represented. If they were to 
be reduced now back to seven, as seems quite likely, it would be a symptom that a 
power struggle is under way –and that somebody is winning.
 
The CPC is the world’s largest political party (80 million members) and 
it has experienced a dramatic growth over the last decade… 
An increase in party membership is a symptom of a power struggle as well. During 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the Gang of Four packed the Party with their 
own supporters and CPC membership increased dramatically. A rapid expansion is a 
very negative sign: you cannot maintain a tight selection process, and so incompetent 
or corrupt or partisan people get in. It can happen as a result of factional positioning 
or of a deliberate policy aiming at reinforcing bureaucracy (China’s bureaucracy is 
actually too small to manage a capitalist economy for such a large population). Since 
Deng Xiaoping, the Party has also been co-opting red capitalists (better to have them 
inside than outside), and new capitalists –who distrust bureaucracy and thus the 
Party— have been interested in getting in (better to be inside than outside).
 
You have mentioned “power struggle” twice…
There are definite signs of it. For instance, last August Politburo members held an 
informal meeting at the holiday resort of Beidaihe. Observers assumed they were 
ironing out a consensus for the Party Congress. But the meeting broke up without a 
coomplete agreement. Then Xi Jinping, the expected next paramount leader, disap-
peared for two weeks, and no explanation was given when he got back. Another 
sign: the 18th Congress was initially scheduled for October –but it will be held in 
November. It has been an eventful year, and Bo Xilai’s ousting on corruption charges 
is a political quake with many aftershocks. To the extent that Bo Xilai wanted to build 
a political alternative to the current liberal trend, he represents one side of the major 
ideological struggle going on between the liberals (who demand more market, so as 
to generate wealth and perhaps to weaken government) and the new left (who wants 
to redistribute wealth, in order to boost internal demand and reducethe centrifugal 
forces of social inequality).
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What are the main issues?
First of all, the income disparities between the East Coast and the rest of the coun-
try: inequality in China is growing fast and is reaching the same level as the US. 
Second (related to the first), the pressing need to develop an internal market to keep 
the economy growing –half of the population that still lives in the countryside lacks 
the necessary purchasing power to create a sustainable domestic consumer market. 
Third, corruption: it is the Chinese citizens’ number one worry today –they are quite 
simply fed up with it.
 
Are they asking for change?
People want to improve their standard of living, and will react strongly if their stan-
dard of living is undermined. They are not asking for anything else --except fight-
ing corruption and perhaps maintaining national pride. Within the Party, where it is 
debated whether political power comes from the people (as Abraham Lincoln said) 
or whether political power is to be used for the people (as Lenin and Mao insisted), 
the situation is quite different. For instance, Wen Jiabao (who led the fight against Bo 
Xilai, and whose faction is now seriously talking about political reform) maintains 
that it is the people who have delegated power to the Party –and hence, they can 
withdraw it. This is very close to democracy as we understand it, but vastly differ-
ent from what it traditionally means in China, which is: unelected technocrats run 
things, and periodically submit  policies for the people’s approval (Sun Yat-sen’s 
way). Wen Jinbao says that the Party must earn its legitimacy.
 
And what about Xi Jinping?
In February 2011 an association was founded, the Children of Yan’an (Yan’an was the 
cradle of Mao’s Revolution), by sons and daughters of veterans of the Long March 
–like Xi Jinping. They have held three more meetings since then, and written and 
sent a manifesto to the Central Committee asking for more internal Party democracy 
and political reform as an antidote to party decay. They use the term New Democ-
racy (used in the 1930s and 1940s) to describe a different relationship between the 
people and government. We are talking about a lobby here. Xi Jinping (who was in 
the army, as is his wife) belongs to a generation of “princelings” –the children of the 
revolutionary leaders, who have benefited the most from economic development 
(they are not red capitalists, but nomenklatura turning capitalist), and many of whom 
are now solidifying their own power. This is a large faction, a political aristocracy 
with multiple connections. The other huge faction is the meritocracy: those who have 
risen through the Communist Youth League, following a long initiatory path of eval-
uation and selection. Just to make things more complicated, many leaders belong to 
both groups. Whether liberal or new left, they compete basically to generate wealth, 
since political success is equated to increasing your constituency’s GDP, rather than 
redistributing wealth or protecting the environment.
 
For many years, Chinese foreign policy was guided by Deng Xiaoping’s 
cautious injunction: “Hide brightness, cherish obscurity” –that is: bide 
our time. Does this still apply or has China’s time finally arrived?
Both major powers are going at present through leadership struggles, so some in-
flammatory speeches and a certain degree of demagoguery should come as no sur-
prise. Stirring nationalism is quite useful if you are trying to manoeuver politically 
inside the Party, but it entails unwise rhetoric --and China is keen on being extremely 
prudent in foreign policy matters. The Chinese take as a premise that there will be no 
world war in the next twenty years and that, in any case, they cannot undertake any 
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foreign adventures because they need stability for at least that long in order to settle 
their domestic problems. So, China is all for multilateralism: it prefers G20 to G8, 
and does not want to insinuate the possibility of a G2 (the US and China). However, 
Deng’s advice to keep a low profile in world affairs is not exactly what many in the 
Party have in mind today, for whom China’s time has finally arrived and the ques-
tion is now how to consolidate its world power. They talk quite openly about what 
a world order dominated by China would be like –and how the dominant powers 
would react to it. To them,  “peaceful development” is the model to follow: they 
know they must not do anything belligerent that would remind their neighbours of 
how Japan behaved in the past.
 
In the US many observers think that the Chinese are becoming 
militaristic: China’s military budget has increased by 11.2% this year, 
passing the $100 billion mark…
Yes: this amounts to roughly $100 per Chinese citizen (accounting for less than 10% 
of world military spending), whereas the US military budget is about $2200 per US 
citizen (accounting for more than 40% of world military spending). The West thinks 
that when military spending goes up, so does international insecurity, and they have 
their own recent history to back this up. But, to what extent  does an emergent power 
necessarily provoke “insecurity”? China is building infrastructures to guarantee sup-
plies (of raw materials) and overseas markets (for manufactured goods) on routes to 
and from its economy –notably, the so-called “necklace of pearls”, a string of deep-
water ports throughout Southeast and South Asia and into the Persian Gulf,as well 
as a merchant fleet and a modernized navy to protect that fleet. The US says that 
they are not doing it to protect business and commerce, but to compete for world 
dominance –a completely different analysis. But if you observe what the Chinese are 
doing in Africa and South America, it is quite clear that the engine of China’s foreign 
policy is economic: they need raw materials and they need markets. There is an an-
cient Chinese proverb that defines China’s approach to policy perfectly: You cross a 
river by finding the stepping stones. It is, in fact, free from any doctrinaire approach.
 
In any case, it has recently hit the Western news that this year’s 
publishing sensation in China is Unhappy, a collection of angry essays 
railing at foreign bullies and domestic fascination with western ways. 
Despite negative reviews, it has topped the bestseller lists. How 
widely shared is the thought of breaking up with the West? 
Nationalism in China is a very complex concept. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
West (particularly the US) was the model to follow: thousands of Chinese students 
went to read for degrees and graduated from western universities. But then, in 1999, 
NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the popular reaction against 
the West (the US and NATO) was huge (the government tolerated demonstrations). 
In the intellectual field, post-colonialism and postmodernism became the rage and 
artists began to look to Chinese tradition for a non-western, alternative source for 
modernity. The government, however, is afraid of nationalism, reasoning that when 
Maoism collapsed, capitalism took its place (with Chinese characteristics), but now, 
if the economy were to slump, what ideology would replace that? There is social un-
rest simmering already and the middle-classes would surely turn against the Party if 
money stopped coming in (a 6% GDP growth or less would generate unbearable un-
employment). One strong possibility is populist nationalism. The Party knows this 
and is frightened –and so are intellectuals. We have seen what nationalism has done 
to the Balkans and simplistic populist solutions cannot solve complex problems in an 
interdependent world economy.    
